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and delineating the reasons or justifications for
the programs. In particular, were they established
to serve a public or a special-interest benefit? The
extent to which a given procedure is efficient
depends on what the program is expected to
achieve. For example, if a student-loan program
is supposed to make it possible for poor students
to attend colleges so that they can become wealth-
ier than they otherwise would be, the interest rate
charged might be a market rate. If this is the pur-
pose of the program, an essential question is
whether there is market failure—that is, why and
to what extent do private sector lenders not offer
such loans? Is there some legal or regulatory
impediment that forecloses or restricts private
sector lending? Is such lending insufficient
because there is a positive (negative) externality
that could effectively be achieved (alleviated)
with a government program? If the purpose of the
program is to benefit colleges, though, by allowing
them to charge higher tuition to poor students
rather than offer them scholarships and/or if the
purpose is to help poor students become better
educated in general because this benefits the
nation, the interest rate should be below market
rates for all poor students. 
An understanding of the reason for specific
programs also is necessary to answer Elliott’s
concerns and questions of how those programs
should be administered. The “law of unintended
consequences” plays a particularly important
role here. An example is the bidding procedure
for rights to the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) spectrum that Elliott discusses.
D
ouglas Elliott (2006) begins his dis-
cussion of some important issues
concerning how federal government
financing and insurance programs
should be structured by assuming that these
programs are here to stay. He writes (p. 260): “The
federal government has a long history as a lender
and insurer, and there is no sign that this is going
to change. If anything, concerns about the federal
budget deficit are likely to encourage an expan-
sion of these programs.” He perceptively explains
that “Lending and insurance programs allow
politicians to throw out multibillion dollar fig-
ures for the volume of good their proposals will
provide, without having the budget cost approach
those levels. This is especially true if politicians
use overly optimistic figures for the proportion of
borrowers who will actually pay the loans back
or the proportion of insureds who will submit
claims.” Having presented both the fact of the
programs and reasons why they are attractive
to legislators, Elliott turns from a positive (or
descriptive, albeit very brief) introduction, to the
normative (or prescriptive) issues of how the pro-
grams should be structured, the budget rules that
should be adopted, the human resources that
should be harnessed to manage the programs effi-
ciently, and the tools those managers should use. 
Considering how much of value he has to say
and the important questions he raises on how the
programs should be run, it is reasonable for him
to restrict his paper to normative issues. However,
I suggest that the questions he raises cannot be
answered successfully without first understanding
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      If the objective were to benefit smaller and minor-
ity businesses, the auction rules should be struc-
tured to give these companies an advantage. The
situation he describes, where smaller businesses
and minority-designated firms with little equity
were awarded rights to spectra, is consistent with
that objective. But, why was the contract written
so that, when these firms could not pay their con-
tractual obligations, they nevertheless could still
control the spectra they were awarded? This might
be an unintended outcome that was not foreseen
by drafters of the legislation because of inadequate
analysis. In this event, a better analysis could have
avoided the situation and it could be corrected
with new legislation. But, it might be that the
drafters of the legislation intended to benefit par-
ticular constituents. These drafters might have
known people represented by favored lobbyists
and other donors to their campaigns who con-
trolled “smaller” businesses and minority-owned
companies (or companies fronted by minorities).
If this were the case, the procedures adopted did
what was intended. 
Despite what might appear to be cynicism
(or reality) on my part, I agree with Elliott that
understanding the extent of a subsidy or wealth
transfer would be useful to many. Legislators who
sponsored the program may not have realized that
it would cost as much as it does and, therefore,
might move to repeal or restrict it. Or, legislators
and others who do not want to favor a particular
group could use these numbers to defeat or reduce
the cost of financial programs, in part by appeal-
ing to citizens to vote against politicians who are
shown to be misusing public resources. It would
be useful, therefore, to examine the extent to
which government financing and insurance
programs are likely to provide public or special-
interest benefits. 
THE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS
OF PRIVATE-MARKET SOLUTIONS
Benefits
It is virtually a truism (that I presume I need
not describe here) that private-market solutions
usually are preferable to government solutions.
This conclusion, though, is subject to five impor-
tant assumptions. Note, though, that even when
these assumptions obtain, the benefits from
government intervention might be more than off-
set by the cost of inefficiencies because of the
absence of a profit and loss motive. Although
government agents have incentives to increase
their budgets, and often to stay within their
budgets, exceptional performance (above-normal
profits or lower costs) rarely increases the agents’
wealth. Further, excessive losses not only do not
result in the bankruptcy of their organizations and
the consequent loss of their personal wealth, but
may bring forth additional budget allocations to
keep the programs alive. In addition, government
agents may find it difficult to determine what price
to charge different recipients for the services pro-
vided by their agency. Unlike privately owned
organizations, they do not face competitors who
tend to pick-off overcharged clients and often do
not have the political ability to increase charges
on underpriced clients. An example presented
by Elliott is federally provided flood insurance,
which undercharges owners of older structures
and overcharges owners of new structures. 
LIMITATIONS AND CAVEATS:
THE FIVE ASSUMPTIONS
One basic assumption is that people are the
best judges of what is best for them. This is not
always the case. Generally, children and people
of severely diminished intelligence are seen as
not capable of making decisions that are in their
own self interest. But, this caveat does not apply
to the government programs in question. 
A second assumption is that distribution of
wealth is optimal (however that might be defined
operationally). Of course, the citizens of a democ-
racy may believe that the nation benefits when
wealth is redistributed to bring the poorest citi-
zens up to some level of well-being and keep the
richest citizens from controlling too great a pro-
portion of resources (even though both levels are
difficult to define with much precision). In this
event, given the assumption of the primacy of
individual choice, direct redistribution is prefer-
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However, particularly when it comes to giving
up some wealth for the benefit of others, people
(through their elected representatives) often want
those resources to be used in specific ways. Thus,
they may not want the recipients to spend trans-
ferred wealth on alcohol or other drugs, but may
want them to spend it on education or housing.
People who give up some of their wealth also
might believe that one form of transfer is more
effective than another in achieving a desired out-
come. For example, a loan rather than a grant to
poor students may be more effective in getting
them to take full advantage of their educational
opportunities because they will have to repay the
funds advanced. Loans also could be effective in
screening out those who are pretending to be
students in order to get a grant. If these are the
reasons for giving students subsidized loans rather
than grants, students should not be permitted to
avoid repayments by declaring bankruptcy just
after they leave school.1
Third, there should be evidence of a market
failure that can be effectively alleviated with a
government program. For example, presumably
the Small Business Administration was estab-
lished because (it was alleged) established lenders
(banks, in particular) employed market power to
charge small businesses higher interest rates than
justified by costs.2 Direct or indirect loans to
minority, poor, or female home buyers have often
been based on the belief that private lenders are
biased, perhaps as a result of bigotry or ignorance
borne of limited experience, and either charge
these borrowers more onerous terms or refuse to
offer loans.3 But, given the situation in the United
States of substantial competition among financial
institutions and anti-trust laws that make cartels
and agreements to fix prices illegal, there are likely
to be few market failures. Furthermore, where
there are government-imposed barriers to or con-
straints on entry and competition, the most effec-
tive way to help consumers is to remove these
restrictions rather than to establish an alternative
government program. 
Fourth, government programs can be justified
as beneficial to the public if the government has
a cost advantage over private companies. This
can occur when there are economies of scale that
can be achieved only by a nationwide operation.
Restrictions on nationwide bank branching (which
were not fully removed until 1994) exacerbated
this situation. Given these constraints on the
markets, mortgage financing by government-
sponsored (lending) enterprises (GSEs), particu-
larly Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, was beneficial.
Considering that this constraint is no longer pres-
ent and that these GSEs are now privately owned,
there is no justification for continued government
support in the form of investors’ expectation that
the GSEs’ debt is de-facto guaranteed (as shown
by the interest rate the GSEs pay on that debt, even
though they have low capital/asset ratios). 
The interest rate that should be charged for
government loans or assumed for government
projects should take into account losses from
defaults and poor outcomes, in the same way that
private parties include these risks, assuming that
government agents are as capable of assessing the
risks. Considering that political considerations
often play a role in determining the loans and
projects that are made by government agencies
and that these considerations are likely to result
in higher losses, the applicable interest or dis-
count rate should be greater than that employed
in private transactions. 
The government discount rate should mimic
the private discount rate and take into account
timing as well as the amount of the net cash flows
expected to be generated from the loan or project.
Like the private loan rate, the government rate
should include an additional “systematic risk”
premium that is similar to the premium on high-
beta stocks. Loans have higher payouts (less loss
due to default) in good times, when returns on
other assets are high, and lower payouts when
times are bad, when returns on other assets are
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1 Indeed, this is the situation now. However, it has a possibly unin-
tended consequence, in that it gives purveyors of worthless occu-
pationally directed “education” programs strong incentives to
oversell their programs to gullible, often poor, people seeking to
better their situations.
2 An earlier study, though, found that 75 percent of the difference
in rates on smaller loans is explained by higher marginal operat-
ing costs per loan (Benston, 1964).
3 Empirical studies, though, do not support this belief (Benston,
1999).low. Because of this positive covariation, loans
are less desirable compared with assets that
covary negatively with economic conditions—
hence the systematic-risk premium.4
Furthermore, it should be noted that lower
observed interest rates on state and municipal
obligations result from the exemption from income
taxation of the interest. Hence, the lower interest
rate on these obligations is not a net benefit to
the public but simply a transfer of wealth among
taxpayers.
The fifth basic assumption is that the govern-
ment programs reduce negative externalities
(such as pollution) or enhance positive external-
ities (such as research by professors), net of costs.
Student loans might achieve a positive externality
to the extent that it would be detrimental to the
nation if some people would otherwise not be
able to use their talents effectively. An educated
public might also be seen as necessary or at least
desirable for democracy and a well-functioning
modern economy. 
To summarize, government-sponsored or 
-supported finance and insurance programs might
achieve some public benefits. These programs
could be effective for encouraging specific
behavior among recipients that voters (or their
representatives) favor, such as education and
homeownership. However, there are likely to be
both honest and dishonest (that is, actually self-
serving) disagreements as to which people or
programs should be subsidized. Government
could provide financing or insurance where there
is a market failure. However, I believe that this
rationale is of doubtful validity, particularly in
the Internet age, when those who want financing
or insurance can readily find and be contacted
by many private suppliers. Finally, there are few
negative externalities that I can think of related
to finance and insurance. Nor are there many
positive externalities. 
If my conclusions are correct, government
finance and insurance programs primarily serve
to enhance special interests. As Elliott points out,
these programs offer legislators the substantial
advantage of shifting public resources to favored
individuals, groups, and organizations at what
appears to be a smaller cost to taxpayers than
direct subsidies. Furthermore, as he also points
out, the cost of government-provided loans or
loan guarantees and of insurance tends to be
understated in the budget. As he puts it so well
(pp. 260-61), “There are not a lot of other areas
in the government where you can propose a pro-
gram that directs $10 billion to some sector and
claim at the same time that it will directly make
money for the government, at least not in areas




Two types of special-interest benefits should
be distinguished. One that I believe most people
would support (other than those that give rise to
net public benefits, as discussed earlier) is a pro-
gram that offsets costs imposed by other govern-
ment actions or inactions or “acts of God” that are
seen as having a collective impact on all citizens.
An example is damage from an unexpected natural
disaster, such as the massive wave surge due to
Hurricane Katrina that damaged properties many
more miles inland than expected from previous
experience. However, damage from recurrent
hurricanes or likely-though-imperfectly-predicted
earthquakes is expected. Private insurance could
be purchased, and the cost would and should be
borne by people who own properties that are at
risk. Events that are extremely difficult to predict
that might affect large numbers of people, though,
such as extreme acts of terrorism, might justify
some form of government-provided insurance. 
The second type of special-interest benefit is
much more common. It involves a transfer of
wealth from taxpayers to favored people, groups,
and organizations in the form of direct or indirect
subsidies, such as lower interest rates and fees
and the assumption of risks. As Elliott points out,
these programs abound, in large measure because
the cost to taxpayers is difficult to discern and
publicize. Furthermore, when enacted they often
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4 I am indebted to George Pennacchi for clarifying my thinking on
these issues. See Chap. 4 in his forthcoming asset-pricing text
when it comes out (as it surely will). are cloaked in the mantle of “the public interest”
and said to have no cost to taxpayers. Federally
provided flood insurance is an example. The
risk is no different from other risks that typically
are insured, such as fire and wind damage. Why,
then, should the federal government be involved
except to transfer wealth to people who own
structures and property in flood-prone areas?
Unintended Consequences
It is likely that many government lending
and insurance programs were enacted to help a
particular group or sector of the economy that
people in general want to help. For example, given
the past history of racial and gender discrimina-
tion in the United States, I believe that most people
are in favor of, or at least not strongly opposed
to, helping minorities and women get financing
to start new businesses. A perhaps romantic sym-
pathy for small farmers probably has motivated
people to support farm-loan programs. (The initial
questions, though, should be whether, why, and
to what extent loans are not available from private
lenders.) Concern for workers loosing their pen-
sions when their companies declared bankruptcy
(dramatized by the bankruptcy of Studebaker in
1974, which did not fund its retirement fund
adequately) led to the creation of the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) in 1974 as
part of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974. 
Legislators and citizens generally, though,
often do not adequately take into account the
incentives for and ability of “undeserving” indi-
viduals to benefit themselves at the expense of
others. For example, minorities may indeed be
deserving of help in starting businesses. But others
may set up companies that appear to be controlled
by minorities in order to garner the subsidies. In
fact, such people are likely to be more skilled than
real minorities in drafting successful applications
for subsidized loans. Although some small farmers
have benefited from subsidized loans and insur-
ance, most of the subsidies have gone to large
corporate farms. The PBGC has benefited many
employees, but its costs have increased sufficiently
for it to be economically bankrupt: Financially
distressed corporations covered by the PBGC had
incentives to promise their employees higher
guaranteed pensions in exchange for current wage
concessions. Furthermore, the PBGC was not given
the authority or resources (or it did not use the
powers it had) to impose high costs on corpora-
tions that did not adequately fund their pensions
and require that the corporations invest pension
funds in close-to-riskless assets. Of course, as
noted earlier, it may be that drafters of the legis-
lation realized that the programs would benefit
favored people and companies and would be
much more costly than they admitted at the
time. If this were the case, the outcome was not
unintended.
THE RELEVANCE OF ELLIOTT’S
QUESTIONS
Elliott raises several intellectually interesting
and challenging questions, most of which are
related to the “proper” interest rate that should
be charged. As noted earlier, he assumes that the
goal is to use rates that correctly measure the cost
of the programs. Given his focus, I accept this
assumption, for two reasons. First, legislators
may not be aware of the cost of some programs
that they supported based on the belief that the
programs were almost costless to taxpayers. A
second related reason is that public knowledge
of the actual cost to taxpayers of programs might
result in a demand for their cancellation or restric-
tion or, where the programs are cost effective,
expansion. Considering that the Congress and
presidency are now controlled by Republicans,
who presumably are opposed to government
waste and taxation (deficits, of course, are just
the present value of future taxation), such calcu-
lations might not be disregarded. 
MY ANSWERS TO SOME OF
ELLIOTT’S QUESTIONS
Interest Rates on Loans
With respect to Elliott’s concerns about interest
rates, it should be useful to consider initially the
factors that determine interest rates generally.
Six such factors may be distinguished:
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time. This is measured best as the risk-free
real rate (which excludes the effects of
changes in purchasing power).
2. Expected change in purchasing power.
The nominal rate on risk-free obligations
of a given duration provides an effective
measure of the first two factors. It often is
termed the “cost of funds.”
3. The cost of default to the lender. This is
the amount of loss given default by the
borrower at a particular time because of
the borrower’s inability or unwillingness
to repay a loan as contracted. The interest
rate is increased such that the higher pres-
ent value (discounted at the nominal rate
of interest) of the higher interest payments
and the loss given default is zero. 
4. Administrative costs. These include the
cost of determining default risk, recording
the loan and payment thereon, monitoring
the loan, and collecting the payments. As
with the cost of default, the interest rate
should provide the funds required for
these costs.
5. Systematic risk. Such risk increases the
discount rate if the returns on the loan or
project covary positively with the econ-
omy’s discount rate (as is likely for loans,
because both rates are higher [lower] in
good [bad] times).
6. Uncertainty (e.g., variance of expected
cash flows). This affects the interest rate if
the lender is risk averse or cannot construct
a sufficiently diversified portfolio of loans
to reduce uncertainty to a very small num-
ber. Although, as Modigliani and Miller
established, the effect of risk aversion is
eliminated when there is cost-effective
arbitrage, such arbitrage of government
loans may not be possible. 
If a loan is not subsidized, the interest rate
charged should include the effects of the first four
factors. Assuming that both government and
private lenders are risk (uncertainty) neutral and
the government agency is as efficient as a private
lender in assessing the risk of default and in moni-
toring and administering the loans, the “correct”
rate is the same rate a private lender would charge
for a similar loan. 
In responding to Elliott’s questions, I assume
that the goal is not to subsidize borrowers or
insurees. If the goal is to subsidize them, the rate
charged should be lower.
His first question (p. 264) is, “What discount
rate should we use for a floating-rate loan made
by the [federal] government?” My answer is, the
rate charged by commercial lenders for a loan with
similar terms (duration, etc.). The rate should not
be the government’s borrowing rate on similar
obligations with the same duration, as this rate
does not include default and administrative costs
and systematic risk. It might seem that the cost
of defaults should not be included in the relevant
rate because the federal government cannot default
on its obligations (not as long as Federal Reserve
notes are accepted for the payment of debts).
However, some people who borrow from the
government do not repay these debts and some
government-sponsored projects fail. Those costs
necessarily must be borne by taxpayers. Hence,
although the holders of government debt do not
incur losses, they must be borne by someone.
The expected returns from government-financed
programs should cover those expected losses
(assuming, still, that a subsidy is not intended).
Further, losses from default are difficult to esti-
mate and may be biased to serve special interests.
Hence, reference to the commercial rate is a
desirable check and is likely to underestimate
the relevant discount rate.
His second question (p. 266) is, “Should the
federal government use a discount rate that reflects
the uncertainty of future cash flows from a lending
program?” I assume that here Elliott means what
I call the “cost of default.” Assuming no bias in
estimating cash flows, my answer is “yes.” It also
should include administrative and monitoring
costs and systematic risk. However, he later
brings in risk aversion, which I call “uncertainty.”
As noted above, this aspect of the interest rate
should not be included in the interest rate.
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Elliott poses an overall question with respect
to insurance (p. 268): “How can we improve federal
budgeting for insurance programs?” He then
shows that the present cash budgeting system is
“a disaster,” particularly with respect to the PBGC
and flood insurance. I assume for this question
that repeal of these programs and their transfer
to private insurance companies is not politically
feasible. 
With respect to the PBGC, I cannot imagine
any public benefit of a taxpayer subsidy to corpo-
rate pension grantors or pension recipients (who
certainly are not among the poorest of our citi-
zens). Consequently, the PBGC should be restruc-
tured and be required to operate as a self-contained
unit that will get no taxpayer funds, directly or
indirectly by being allowed to borrow from the
Treasury Department if it falls short of funds. It
should have the independent authority to increase
premiums, adequately penalize corporations that
do not make payments sufficient to fully fund
their plans, and regulate and monitor fund assets.
I expect that as premiums are increased, corpo-
rations with well-funded plans will drop out by
converting to defined-contribution plans (e.g.,
401(k) plans) and the PBGC will become even
more insolvent. The Congress and president will
then have to decide whether to bail out present
and prospective pension holders (which Elliott
and I expect them to do). 
Elliott does not ask any questions about flood
insurance, but presents data showing that the
National Flood Insurance Program charges pre-
miums that do not reflect the actuarial risks and
that it reports on a cash basis. Both procedures
distort the costs of the program to taxpayers. As
he makes clear, this should be changed if the goal
is to achieve public benefits. However, it may be
that the goal is to benefit some people at the
expense of others and to deceive voters and per-
haps legislators of the real economic costs of the
program.
People and Tools
Finally, Elliott questions whether government
agencies can employ the people and tools that
would improve the performance of federal credit
and insurance agencies. I suggest that appointing
inexperienced political supporters and cronies
to head such agencies is not desirable. 
CONCLUSION
To summarize, I believe that there are few
public but many private-interest benefits from
government loan and insurance programs. I agree,
though, with Elliott, that these programs are
unlikely to be disbanded and more such programs
are likely to be established. Consequently, from
the viewpoint of taxpayers generally, it would
be preferable to have them organized as self-
sustaining agencies. If they make direct loans,
the Congress can appropriate the funds necessary
to get them started. Loan repayments and fees
collected by the agencies would not be recorded
as federal budgetary inflows, and loans and oper-
ating expenses would not be recorded as budgetary
outflows. To the extent that legislators determine
that their activities should be subsidized, the
necessary amounts would be provided through
appropriations that would be recorded as budget
outflows. The agencies, then, would have an
incentive to operate efficiently so as to maintain
and possibly expand their programs and reduce
the amount of additional funding that the Congress
would have to appropriate. 
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